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A commentary on
Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the
embodied self
by Seth, A. K. (2013). Trends Cogn. Sci. 17,
565–573. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2013.09.007
Interoception is the ability to perceive
and integrate physiological signals from
within the body. It is closely related to the
autonomic system and is a key compo-
nent in the generation of affective states
and abstract representations of the self
(Critchley et al., 2004; Ainley and Tsakiris,
2013). Seth proposes a predictive cod-
ing (PC) model of interoception that
involves a free-energy based explanation of
emotion awareness and selfhood. In this
model, emotions, and in turn the sense
of self, rely on predictions of the causes
of interoceptive signals. Within this frame-
work, the interoceptive system minimizes
free-energy, or the discrepancy between
predictions and interoceptive signals. Free-
energy can be minimized either by updat-
ing predictions about the causes of the
sensory signals (perceptual updating), or
by acting to change autonomic states such
that bodily states are more predictable
(active inference).
The free-energy principle is currently in
vogue in neuroscience. We are no longer
strangers to the idea that perception is an
active iterative process between abstract
representations (predictions) and sensory
feedback (prediction errors) (Clark, 2013).
The basic idea of PC in the cognitive
sciences began with the notion of neu-
ral energy (Helmholtz, 1860) and it has
been present since in the form of the-
oretical proposals and empirical find-
ings, especially in the visual domain (Lee
and Mumford, 2003). Therefore Seth’s
proposal that sensory processing involves
predictions is nothing new. What is new in
Seth’s model is that perception of internal
body signals (interoception), paralleling
the perception of external signals, relies on
top-down predictions of the causes of the
sensory input, rather than being a passive,
bottom-up process.
Is then Seth’s interoceptive inference
model an interesting proposal to explain
emotion awareness and selfhood? My
opinion is yes and that it is worth inves-
tigating. However, there are some aspects
to consider before designing studies to
empirically test Seth’s model.
Seth’s model builds on three main
assumptions. First, emotions are defined
as affective states relying on interactions
between top-down interoceptive predic-
tions and bottom-up interoceptive predic-
tion errors. Following the principles of
PC, there is a constant attempt to min-
imize the discrepancy between the pre-
dicted and the actual sensory events, either
through updating perceptual expectations
or through active inference (Friston et al.,
2010). As Seth nicely explains, active infer-
ence in interoception occurs when predic-
tions are transcribed into reference points
that trigger autonomic homeostatic regu-
lation, occurring when the weight of the
error is low and attention to errors is atten-
uated (Gu et al., 2013).
Fortunately, advances on biomedical
tools allow us to experimentally mon-
itor the body’s physiological signals.
Although, some methodological chal-
lenges still remain when investigating
interoception. This general issue may also
impact on PC studies of interoception.
However, applying PC to interoception,
as proposed in Seth’s model, may allow
us to overcome these challenges. The
main argument of PC is that all sensory
systems are linked by working under iden-
tical code schemes (Friston and Kiebel,
2009). Therefore, Seth’s PC model allows
us to apply knowledge from visual and
other domains to investigate brain and
behavioral mechanisms of interoception.
Neuroimaging studies have demonstrated
direct evidence of PC in visual brain areas
(Egner et al., 2010; Wyart et al., 2012).
Likewise, Seth’s anatomical predictions
(i.e., anterior insular cortex -AIC) can be
tested by using multivoxel pattern anal-
ysis approaches, in combination with
orthogonal experimental designs where
the stimulus presentation probability is
held constant in all conditions (Egner
et al., 2010).
The second assumption in Seth’s model
refers to the AIC as the key structure that
generates, compares, and updates inte-
roceptive predictions. Empirical evidence
has shown that AIC houses a secondary
associative area where interoceptive, exte-
roceptive, and motivational signals con-
verge (Seth and Critchley, 2013). An
important principle of PC explains that the
surprisal generated in one unimodal sys-
tem can be explained away by inferences
in other system via high-order neural areas
(Apps and Tsakiris, in press). Considering
the multimodal nature of the AIC, one
could suggest that the errors in the intero-
ceptive signal can be explained by extero-
ceptive inferences (or vice versa) and that
the interoceptive generative models are
only a part of the way the system explains
errors. Whether the AIC exclusively codes
the surprisal evoked by interoceptive sig-
nals or, alternatively, if the AIC is involved
in top-down general predictions directed
to a more specialized interoceptive circuit,
still remain open questions.
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The third crucial aspect of Seth’s model
is the concept of selfhood. Seth has
employed the idea that selfhood is formed
by the integration of predictive interocep-
tive and exteroceptive signals (Tajadura-
Jimenez and Tsakiris, in press). Individual
differences in the accuracy of interocep-
tive awareness influence integration of
interoceptive and exteroceptive informa-
tion, as shown by studies in body illu-
sions (Tsakiris et al., 2011). Individuals
with low accuracy show more susceptibil-
ity to body illusions, which Seth interprets
as lower precision-weighting of interocep-
tive prediction errors. However, although
a free-energy model of self has been
proposed (Apps and Tsakiris, in press),
as yet there is no evidence to suggest
that self-processing follows the principles
of PC.
Another crucial factor that may influ-
ence interoceptive awareness, and there-
fore self-awareness, is attention. In PC,
attention is considered to be a mechanism
that optimizes the precision of predic-
tion errors during hierarchical inference
(Feldman and Friston, 2010). For exam-
ple, studies in vision have demonstrated
that attention enhances the neural speci-
ficity for expected vs. unexpected stim-
uli in visual cortex (Jiang et al., 2013).
Similarly, directing attention toward inter-
nal body signals might increase the preci-
sion of interoceptive prediction errors and
therefore improve interoceptive awareness.
An individual’s attention to the body can
be significantly enhanced by the prac-
tice of Mindfulness (Farb et al., 2013),
which also has the effect of enhancing both
cortical responses of interoceptive atten-
tion and self-reported interoceptive aware-
ness (Mehling et al., 2013). Within Seth’s
model this might increase the accuracy
of interoceptive inference, emotions, and
self-awareness.
Therefore, I agree with Seth’s proposal
that the brain is a prediction machine that
integrates interoceptive and exteroceptive
information in a Bayesian way. However,
future research is needed to elucidate the
internal properties of the interoceptive
inference.
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